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 COMPLEX ​ ​SYSTEMS ​ ​APPROACH ​ ​TO​ ​THE ​ ​HARD ​ ​PROBLEM​ ​OF​ ​CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
“Our minds thus grow in spots; and like grease-spots, the spots spread. But we let                             
them spread as little as possible: we keep unaltered as much of our old knowledge,                             
as many of our old prejudices and beliefs, as we can. We patch and tinker more than                                 
we renew. The novelty soaks in; it stains the ancient mass; but it is also tinged by what                                   
absorbs it. Our past apperceives and co- operates; and in the new equilibrium in                           
which each step forward in the process of learning terminates, it happens relatively                         
seldom that the new fact is added RAW. More usually it is embedded cooked, as one                               
might ​ ​say, ​ ​or ​ ​stewed​ ​down​ ​in ​ ​the ​ ​sauce​ ​of​ ​the​ ​old.”​ ​~William ​ ​James 
 
In a paper in ​Darwin under Siege ​, Bhakti Niskama Shanta talks about the                         
inadequacies of current scientific approach in exploring subjectivity, the                 
self-conscious perspective, proposing the need for “completely different rational                 
approach...to understand further how conscious beings experience things and how                   
they make their choices.” ​(Shanta 2013) Consciousness has been the bone of                       
contention for philosophers throughout centuries. Indian philosophy largely adopted                 
lived experience as the starting point for its explorations of consciousness. For this                         
reason, from the very beginning, experience was an integral way of grasping                       
consciousness, whose validity as a tool was considered self-evident. Thus, in Indian                       
philosophy, the question was not to move from the brain to mind but to understand                             
experience of an individual and how such an experience is determined through                       
mental structures (and secondarily, the preoccupation with the brain and its relation to                         
the mind) . In contrast, cognitive science (the study of mind and cognition through                         1
interdisciplinary methods, with emphasis on computational methods) found its                 
debates soaked in discussion which primarily involved the brain and mind. Experience                       
was not considered a primary source of information and its validity had to be                           
established to consider it a source of information of mind. With the rise of physicalism                             
and realization that mental states are correlative to brain states, the body was virtually                           
neglected from involvement in understanding the mind and the attempts to reduce                       
mind to the brain were rampant. The inability to explain subjective experience of an                           
individual through neuroscientific findings alone has urged philosophers to explore                   
other ways of understanding the ontology of mind. Over the last few years, embodied                           
cognition and enactive approach have brought back the body as a central participant                         
in this debate, providing fertile grounds to explain the relation of brain, body and                           
mind.  
This paper proposes that we understand the brain as a complex system from which                           
the mind emerges. This emergence is marked by the development of novel property                         
of self-consciousness in human beings. The mind is a process which is embedded                         
throughout the body and thus, the body acts as an actualizing medium for the                           
individual. Thus, the brain is a necessary condition for the mind to be while the mind is                                 
embedded throughout the body. The brain and mind are in reciprocal causal                       
relationship with one another, as is the body and environment with one another. In                           
this paper, embodied cognition is understood through principles of Merleau Ponty’s                     
idea of embodiment, than through Andy Clark and Francis Varela’s alone. To the                         
1​ ​This ​ ​is ​ ​at ​ ​no ​ ​level ​ ​to ​ ​suggest ​ ​that ​ ​Indian ​ ​Philosophy ​ ​did ​ ​not​ ​delve​ ​deeply ​ ​into ​ ​the​ ​relation ​ ​between ​ ​brain ​ ​and ​ ​mind 
(Chennakesavan ​ ​1980; ​ ​Mohanty ​ ​1980)​. ​ ​This ​ ​only ​ ​indicates ​ ​that​ ​the ​ ​starting​ ​points ​ ​for​ ​Indian​ ​philosophy ​ ​and 
cognitive ​ ​science ​ ​at ​ ​large ​ ​were ​ ​different,​ ​thus ​ ​leading ​ ​to ​ ​varying ​ ​questions ​ ​and ​ ​ways ​ ​of​ ​reaching ​ ​answers.  
 question which is central to the conference, ​Is science able to explain the scientist? ​:                           
beginning with the way in which science is defined (what is the criteria for                           
scientificity?), the complex systems approach and emergence claims that the novel                     
property, that of subjectivity, which belongs to the scientist and is embedded                       
throughout her body cannot be reduced to study of any specific organ (including the                           
brain) or explained/predicted through theories of lower-level components. More                 
importantly, the complex systems approach and emergence allows us to understand                     
Brahman as the ultimate Reality, as the emergent structure of our world. Each of us is                               
perceived as embodying the form of Brahman, though the realization of this form only                           
arises ​ ​through​ ​self-knowledge​ ​and ​ ​experience ​ ​of​ ​the​ ​self.  
This paper is divided into five parts: the first part introduces the easy and hard                             
problem of consciousness: definition of consciousness and why the hard problem of                       
consciousness is considered ​hard​. This will include the introduction to qualia. The                       
second part will be a short note on the complex systems approach (CSA) and the                             
notion of emergence. This is followed by an explanation of consciousness from the                         
CSA where the treatment of easy problems of consciousness is explicated. With the                         
fourth section, we reach the central part of the paper: qualia. This will provide a                             
detailed overview to the workings of mind, its structure (world-orientation) and the                       
emergence of experience, thus forming a preliminary to dealing with the hard                       
problem. In the fifth section, the concepts laid out in the previous sections are pieced                             
together to respond to the hard problem with a concluding remark on where we can                             
access ​ ​qualia ​ ​of ​ ​the​ ​other.  
 
PART ​ ​1: ​ ​WHAT ​ ​IS ​ ​CONSCIOUSNESS? 
 
1.1. ​ ​HEURISTIC ​ ​DEFINITION​ ​OF​ ​CONSCIOUSNESS  
 
An exploration of easy and hard problem of consciousness can be discussed                       
reasonably with acknowledgement of the amount of ambiguity and concerted efforts                     
which have been directed towards defining consciousness over the years. This is the                         
case in almost every discipline which is concerned with exploring the mind. Largely,                         
consciousness​ ​can ​ ​be​ ​seen​ ​as​ ​a ​ ​property​ ​of​ ​the​ ​subject​ ​or ​ ​of​ ​mental​ ​states.  
A. As a property of the subject, consciousness is understood commonly as the                       
state where a creature is awake and thus, senses and responds to the                         
environment. It can also be said that a creature is conscious when it is aware of                               
an ​ ​other ​ ​(it ​ ​is ​ ​conscious ​ ​of ​ ​something).  
B. As a property of mental states, a mental state is said to be conscious when it                               
figures in the ​stream of consciousness of the subject. Here, the implications of                         
considering consciousness a ​stream ​are debatable. It is used here largely to                       
indicate ​ ​the ​ ​contrast​ ​between​ ​the ​ ​former ​ ​and​ ​latter ​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​consciousness.  
In the former sense, consciousness is considered to be property of a creature                         
as a whole where the sensing and responding is directed towards an object ​x​:                           
a subject A is conscious if it senses and responds to an object ​x​. Here, the                               
criteria for being conscious is to sense and respond to the object. In the later                             
sense, consciousness is considered a property of mental state (hope or desire                       
or anger) when the subject undergoing it becomes aware of it- there is a                           
mental state ​m such that the subject possessing it is conscious of it if and only                               
if….. ​ ​Here​ ​the​ ​criteria​ ​can ​ ​be ​ ​self-consciousness​ ​or ​ ​others.  
 In philosophy of mind, consciousness is generally received in the latter sense where it                           
is considered a property of mental states. There can be conscious or unconscious or                           
non-conscious mental states. Our purpose is to find under what conditions a certain                         
mental state can be considered conscious, how such a consciousness of mental state                         
can be understood using suitable tools and why a subject becomes conscious of ​x                           
and not-of-​y​. Largely, the first two are housed as easy problems of consciousness                         
while ​ ​the ​ ​third​ ​one ​ ​inhabits​ ​the​ ​hard​ ​problem ​ ​of​ ​consciousness.  
While it is true that defining consciousness is an overwhelming task, it is important to                             
begin with a definition of consciousness which will clearly direct course of the paper.                           
For this reason, I will be starting with a heuristic definition: consciousness is the                           
capacity to sense and respond, owing to the ability to distinguish oneself from the                           
environment. Consciousness is interchangeably used with self-awareness. By               
understanding ​ ​consciousness​ ​in ​ ​this​ ​way,​ ​we​ ​will​ ​be​ ​able​ ​to ​ ​do ​ ​the​ ​following: 
A. Consider levels of consciousness in correspondence to the levels of                   
complexity of a system (with brain featuring as a highly-complex one), thus                       
making ​ ​space​ ​for​ ​mentality​ ​of​ ​animals;  
B. Explore the possibility of artificial intelligence while keeping intact the crucial                     
property ​ ​of ​ ​identity​ ​of ​ ​an​ ​individual; 
C. Understand mental states as inherently actualised through the body (clearing,                   
initially at least, the risk of ontological dualism): since every movement of                       
sensing ​ ​and ​ ​responding ​ ​is​ ​the​ ​expression ​ ​of​ ​mental​ ​state​ ​of​ ​the​ ​system.  
Thus, consciousness is the capacity to sense and respond, owing to the ability to                           
distinguish oneself from the environment. Systems which surpass a certain level of                       
complexity exhibit spatiotemporal integrity through boundary conditions and have                 
mechanisms to sense and respond effectively to the environment. These systems are                       
considered to be latently conscious at all times and actively conscious when they are                           
sensing ​ ​and ​ ​responding ​ ​to​ ​the​ ​environment.  
 
1.2. ​ ​EASY ​ ​AND ​ ​HARD ​ ​PROBLEM ​ ​OF ​ ​CONSCIOUSNESS 
In his paper “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness” ​(Chalmers 1995) ​, David                         
Chalmers introduced the distinction between easy and hard problem of                   
consciousness . The easy problems of consciousness are those which are “are                     2
straightforwardly vulnerable to explanation in terms of computational or neural                   
mechanisms.” ​(Chalmers 2010)​. These include but are not exhaustive of: capacity to                       
discriminate, classify and respond to the environment, cognitively integrating                 
information, reporting of mental states, the power to access one’s own states and                         
others.  
The hard problem of consciousness is the subjectivity involved in                   
what-we-experience. The process of perceiving the world and thinking about it is                       
accompanied by an inseparable subjective element. This is also labelled as qualia, the                         
qualitative character of an experience. In Nagel’s terms ​(Nagel 1974)​,                   
what-it-is-likeness ​of a conscious system. In the next section, we will explore why the                           
hard ​ ​problem​ ​of ​ ​consciousness ​ ​is ​ ​considered​ ​​hard​.  
 
 
2​ ​​ ​In ​ ​his ​ ​paper, ​ ​Chalmers ​ ​does ​ ​not ​ ​begin ​ ​with ​ ​a ​ ​definition ​ ​of​ ​consciousness,​ ​as ​ ​his ​ ​purpose ​ ​was ​ ​to ​ ​delineate​ ​what​ ​has 
been ​ ​considered ​ ​the ​ ​hard-problem ​ ​about ​ ​consciousness ​ ​itself,​ ​within ​ ​philosophy​ ​of​ ​mind,​ ​in ​ ​line ​ ​with ​ ​the ​ ​various 
ways ​ ​in ​ ​which ​ ​it ​ ​has ​ ​been ​ ​defined. ​ ​For​ ​this​ ​reason,​ ​this ​ ​paper ​ ​picks ​ ​up ​ ​the​ ​distinction ​ ​and ​ ​tries ​ ​to ​ ​see​ ​if​ ​within ​ ​the 
complex ​ ​systems ​ ​approach ​ ​and ​ ​emergence, ​ ​the ​ ​hard ​ ​problem ​ ​can ​ ​be​ ​addressed ​ ​adequately.  
 1.3. ​ ​THE ​ ​HEURISTIC ​ ​DEFINITION​ ​AND ​ ​EASY-HARD ​ ​PROBLEM​ ​DISTINCTION  
In this section, we will begin by recapping the definition of consciousness, moving on                           
to reflect how the easy and hard problems can be understood in light of this                             
definition.  
 
D ​f of Consciousness: Capacity to sense and respond to the environment, owing to the                           
ability ​ ​to ​ ​distinguish ​ ​oneself ​ ​from ​ ​it.  
 
Carrying this definition, the easy problems can be understood as those which are                         
involved in the sensing and responding to the environment. We sense a multitude of                           
stimuli in the environment but respond coherently to a unitarily received landscape. A                         
series of other features also populate our capacity to respond to the environment:                         
complex systems can access their internal state and respond to the environment by                         
providing a report on them, they can control their behaviour, they can focus their                           
attention ​ ​on ​ ​a ​ ​certain ​ ​task. 
 
Why are the easy problems easy? ​Chalmers mentions that the easy problems are                         
easy precisely because they ask for functional explanations of abilities: that is, they                         
seek mechanisms in which the function can be performed. How such explanations are                         
provided ​ ​within ​ ​complex​ ​systems​ ​approach ​ ​is​ ​outlined​ ​in​ ​the​ ​fourth ​ ​part.  
 
Following the above mentioned definition of consciousness, the hard problem of                     
consciousness would be to explain ​why a system senses and responds to the                         
environment in a certain way. The entire body receives the environment (a specific                         
stimulant or a set of conditions) in a certain way, which cannot be duplicated or                             
equalized to that which another body undergoes. This explicates what it is like to be a                               
subject ​ ​​x ​-​ ​it​ ​manifests ​ ​the​ ​perspective​ ​of​ ​the​ ​system.  
 
Why is the hard problem of consciousness hard? ​While the easy problems need us to                             
explain how a function is performed within a system, the hard problem asks for the                             
structure which determines status of the system as a whole as it experiences the                           
world, continuously. This asking is a seeking for the structure of experience itself, of                           
why ​the system senses and responds to the world in a certain manner. This question                             
arises because we observe that there are systems of different kinds of complexity and                           
each receive the common world we inhabit in drastically diverse ways, evident                       
through the varying responses. This act of receiving the world encompasses the                       












 PART ​ ​2: ​ ​COMPLEX ​ ​SYSTEMS ​ ​APPROACH​ ​AND ​ ​EMERGENCE 
 
2.1. ​ ​COMPLEX ​ ​SYSTEMS 
 
Complex system refers to a structured arrangement of components which are                     3
non-linearly interacting with one another and self-organizing themselves to respond                   4 5
effectively to the internal and external changes in the environment. Borrowing from                       
Mario Bunge ​(Bunge 2000) ​, we adopt the following axioms in complex systems                       
approach ​ ​(CSA): 
A. Everything, whether concrete or abstract, is a system or an actual or potential                         
component ​ ​of ​ ​a ​ ​system; 
B. Systems have systemic (emergent) features that their components lack,                 
whence 
C. All problems should be approached in a systemic rather than in a sectoral                         
fashion; 
D. All​ ​ideas​ ​should ​ ​be​ ​put ​ ​together ​ ​into ​ ​systems​ ​(theories);​ ​and 
E. The testing of anything, whether idea or artifact, assumes the validity of other                         
items,​ ​which ​ ​are ​ ​taken ​ ​as ​ ​benchmarks,​ ​at​ ​least​ ​for ​ ​the​ ​time ​ ​being. 
By following such an approach, it becomes possible to account for as many possible                           
factors as involved in explaining and predicting behaviour of the system. This can be                           
explained by comparing the approach with other attempts to explain interaction                     
between brain and mind. Identity theory says that brain states are mental states, thus                           
we can understand mental states through sources of information about the brain-                       
primarily MRI. However, in such a move, we do not gather information about the                           
subject in a holistic manner: from her behaviour, from the way in which she interacts                             
with the world at large- which is where we find her mind extended- embedded in her                               
body and extended in the world around her. Eliminative materialism also faces the                         
same charge. While choosing the approach, the aim is to find a method which would                             
allow us to collect as much information as possible and then, to organize it in such a                                 
manner that it would reflect the form of life that the system embodies. This is possible                               
through ​ ​the​ ​complex ​ ​systems​ ​approach.  
 
2.2. ​ ​EMERGENCE  
Along with understanding an existent as a complex system, the notion of emergence                         
allows us to grasp the idea that the whole is other than the sum of its parts. Kurt                                   
Koffka, a prominent Gestalt psychologist pointed out that it is more apt to talk of the                               
whole as an ​other ​than as ​greater than the sum of its parts ​(Dewey 2017) ​. Coming to                                 
the definition of emergence: Emergence is the process of development of novel                       
properties/wholes from the self-organization of components in a system. Novel                   
properties refers to those which are not shared by any of the constituents. Such                           
3​ ​Structured ​ ​arrangement ​ ​indicates ​ ​that ​ ​the ​ ​components ​ ​are ​ ​interacting ​ ​with ​ ​one ​ ​another,​ ​without​ ​there​ ​being​ ​a 
central ​ ​or ​ ​mother ​ ​component. ​ ​There ​ ​can ​ ​be ​ ​sub-systems ​ ​which​ ​have ​ ​varying ​ ​functions, ​ ​which​ ​can ​ ​be ​ ​ordered ​ ​on ​ ​the 
basis ​ ​of ​ ​their ​ ​contribution ​ ​towards ​ ​stability ​ ​of ​ ​the ​ ​system.  
4​ ​Non-linearity ​ ​refers ​ ​the ​ ​phenomenon ​ ​where ​ ​the ​ ​effect ​ ​is ​ ​not​ ​proportional ​ ​to ​ ​the​ ​cause.​ ​There ​ ​are ​ ​largely ​ ​two 
types ​ ​of ​ ​non-linear ​ ​interaction: ​ ​positive ​ ​feedback​ ​mechanism ​ ​and ​ ​negative​ ​feedback​ ​mechanism.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​positive 
non-linear ​ ​interaction, ​ ​the ​ ​effect​ ​is ​ ​amplified ​ ​in ​ ​proportion ​ ​to ​ ​the​ ​cause,​ ​as ​ ​in​ ​the ​ ​case​ ​of​ ​an ​ ​infection ​ ​turning ​ ​into ​ ​an 
epidemic ​ ​or ​ ​an ​ ​employee ​ ​mistreatment​ ​turning ​ ​into ​ ​a ​ ​labor ​ ​strike.​ ​In ​ ​case ​ ​of​ ​negative​ ​feedback​ ​system,​ ​the​ ​effect​ ​is 
diminished ​ ​in ​ ​comparison ​ ​to ​ ​the ​ ​cause.​ ​A ​ ​constant​ ​series ​ ​of​ ​positive ​ ​and ​ ​negative ​ ​feedback​ ​mechanisms ​ ​allow ​ ​the 
system ​ ​to ​ ​restore ​ ​its ​ ​stability, ​ ​in ​ ​confrontation ​ ​with ​ ​disturbance.  
5​ ​Self-organization ​ ​refers ​ ​to ​ ​the ​ ​process​ ​where ​ ​global ​ ​structure ​ ​develops ​ ​spontaneously ​ ​from ​ ​local​ ​interactions 
between ​ ​components.  
 properties allow the system, as a whole, to be marked as a member of higher order of                                 
being, ​ ​with ​ ​causal​ ​power ​ ​to ​ ​affect ​ ​the​ ​lower-level​ ​components.  
With emergence, it becomes possible to begin observing a system as a qualitatively                         
distinct individual. This qualitatively distinct individual exhibits spatiotemporal               
integrity, verifiable through boundary conditions and has causal power that is                     6
oriented ​ ​towards ​ ​stable ​ ​equilibrium ​ ​of​ ​the​ ​whole.  
 
 
2.3. ​ ​THE ​ ​INTEGRATION ​ ​OF ​ ​CSA​ ​AND ​ ​EMERGENCE  
This section discusses how following the complex systems approach, in company with                       
notion of emergence allows us to handle the hard problem of consciousness. A                         
detailed note on treatment of consciousness within this approach is provided in the                         
next ​ ​section. 
An integration of the complex systems approach and emergence allows us to                       
understand​ ​every ​ ​existent ​ ​through​ ​the​ ​following​ ​two ​ ​stages: 
1. Consider the existent as an integral whole in itself (as a complex system with a                             
novel​ ​property); 
2. Consider the existent as a component of a larger system (allowing to take into                           
account ​ ​series ​ ​of ​ ​factors ​ ​which ​ ​can​ ​contribute ​ ​towards​ ​its​ ​behaviour).  
By positioning an existent as an integral whole, we can account for the irreducibility of                             
its behaviour to the causal power of its components and by situating it as a                             
component within a larger system, we can explore the factors which affect it, as a                             
whole.  
 
2.3.1. ​ ​WHY ​ ​TALK​ ​OF ​ ​IRREDUCIBILITY? 
The hard problem of consciousness is fundamentally an issue of asking if the systemic                           
property of brain, consciousness can be reduced to the activities of its components,                         
the interaction between the neurons. By understanding the irreducible nature of                     
consciousness, we can identify that the question, ​Where is qualia in the brain? ​is                           
mis ​placed ​. The locus of qualia is our entire body consistently interacting with its                         
environment,​ ​the​ ​lived​ ​experience ​ ​of​ ​this ​ ​body.  
 
2.3.2. ​ ​IRREDUCIBILITY 
To say that a system ​x is ontologically irreducible to its components C ​1​, C​2, ​C​3​….​C ​n is to                                 
claim that the causal power of x (exhibited through its behaviour) is not derived from                             
the causal power of its components alone. This happens because when we consider                         
causal power of the components alone, we cease to look at the whole, the system.                             
The epistemological counterpart to this is to say that a system ​x is epistemologically                           
irreducible to its components C ​1​, C​2, ​C​3​….​C ​n ​is to claim that the explanation and                           
prediction of behaviour of ​x cannot be carried out through theories which apply to the                             
lower-level components. The relation between these two senses of irreducibility                   
(ontological​ ​and​ ​epistemological) ​ ​can​ ​be​ ​stated ​ ​in​ ​the​ ​following ​ ​ways:  
● A system which can be ontologically reduced to its components can be                       
epistemologically​ ​reduced;  
6​ ​“... ​ ​a ​ ​system ​ ​that ​ ​is ​ ​generated ​ ​through ​ ​a ​ ​closed ​ ​organisation ​ ​of​ ​production ​ ​processes ​ ​such​ ​that​ ​the​ ​same 
organisation ​ ​of ​ ​processes ​ ​is ​ ​regenerated ​ ​through​ ​the​ ​interaction ​ ​of​ ​its ​ ​own ​ ​products ​ ​(components),​ ​and ​ ​a ​ ​boundary 
emerges ​ ​as ​ ​a ​ ​result ​ ​of ​ ​the ​ ​same ​ ​constitutive ​ ​processes.” ​ ​​(Boulding ​ ​and ​ ​Khalil​ ​2002) 
 ● When an epistemological reduction of ontologically reducible system is not                   
possible, it is due to lack of information about the components (current                       
knowledge); ​ ​and  
● When an attempt to epistemologically reduce a system which cannot be                     
ontologically reduced to its components is made, then we encounter the ontic                       
residue ​ ​of ​ ​novel​ ​quality​ ​belonging​ ​to ​ ​the​ ​whole.  
 
2.3.3. ​ ​ONTIC ​ ​RESIDUE​ ​OF​ ​NOVEL​ ​QUALITY 
When we try to explain or predict behaviour of a system through its components, to                             
which it cannot be ontologically reduced, we encounter ontic residue of novel quality.                         
This occurs because, as mentioned earlier, in attempting to explain the whole through                         
its components, we lose sight of that which marks the qualitative distinction of the                           
whole ​ ​as ​ ​an ​ ​individual,​ ​its ​ ​novel​ ​property.  
Let us take example of cells and atoms. As atoms self-organize, we witness the                           
emergence of molecules. Uptil this point, we observe molecular properties: molecular                     
size, molecular formula, melting and boiling point, solubility in water, electrical                     
conductivity and others. After a certain point of complexity, we encounter the                       
emergence of cells which possess the following novel properties among many others:                       
capacity to reproduce, capacity to self-regulate, ability to acquire and utilize energy,                       
capacity to sense and respond to stimuli. Ontologically, the cells have properties                       
which are unpossessed by its components, atoms. Thus, they cannot be ontologically                       
reduced. When we attempt to epistemologically reduce them, then we encounter that                       
we cannot explain property of self-regulation (which applies only to a cell, which has                           
membrane that defines its spatiotemporal integrity). A further exploration of                   
irreducibility ​ ​can ​ ​be ​ ​made ​ ​in ​ ​more ​ ​detailed​ ​terms​ ​through​ ​the​ ​idea​ ​of​ ​order ​ ​and​ ​level. 
 
2.3.4. ​ ​ORDER ​ ​AND ​ ​LEVEL 
An order refers to the kind of causal power an existent exercises to negotiate its                             
survival in the environment. To find the causal power of a system, we have to find out                                 
the complex system within which it is a component (say, a human being ​x can be                               
considered a component within the complex system of society or community), and lay                         
down the properties it has through its behaviour, accompanied by self-reports and                       
corroborated through physiological monitoring in sync with its internal structure.                   
There ​ ​are ​ ​broadly​ ​three​ ​orders: 
A. Material: Those systems which are oriented towards thermal equilibrium alone                   
are considered members of material order. The novel quality of material order                       
is ​ ​being. ​ ​To ​ ​be, ​ ​is​ ​to​ ​move​ ​towards​ ​thermal​ ​equilibrium.  
The members of sentient and phenomenal order possess a sense of self. This sense                           
of self is simply that recognition of oneself as distinct from the environment. This will                             
include all living beings. In CSA, to be a mind is characteristic of sentient and                             
phenomenal​ ​order.​ ​Thus, ​ ​we​ ​witness ​ ​mentality​ ​in​ ​the ​ ​following​ ​two ​ ​orders:  
B. Sentient: Those systems which have the capacity to sense and respond to its                         
environment, owing to the ability to distinguish itself from the environment are                       
considered members of sentient order. The novel quality of sentient order is                       
consciousness or self-awareness, minimally defined as, the capacity to                 
distinguish oneself from the environment and to orient oneself towards stable                     
equilibrium.  
 C. Phenomenal: Those systems which have the capacity to qualitatively                 
distinguish itself from the environment, exhibited through the exercise of                   
choice and responsibility. Here, the primal choice is that of choosing one’s                       
source of stable equilibrium, choice being the ability to exhibit preference for a                         
certain form of living and the responsibility is to recognize and acknowledge                       
one’s contribution towards an occurrence. The novel quality of phenomenal                   
order is self-consciousness. Thus, members of phenomenal order can choose                   
the ​ ​source ​ ​of ​ ​their ​ ​stable​ ​equilibrium​ ​and ​ ​also ​ ​set​ ​up ​ ​conditions​ ​to ​ ​fulfill​ ​them.  
No appeal to a non-physical is made when we present such a hierarchy. The                           7
hierarchy is to exhibit that the higher the complexity, the greater the capacity of                           
system to adapt to its environment by setting up conditions for fulfilment of its stable                             
equilibrium (after a certain point, we encounter self-consciousness where the member                     
can ​ ​​choose​​ ​its ​ ​source​ ​of ​ ​stable​ ​equilibrium ​ ​and​ ​also ​ ​set​ ​up ​ ​conditions​ ​to​ ​fulfill ​ ​it).  
 
PART ​ ​3: ​ ​CONSCIOUSNESS​ ​IN ​ ​COMPLEX​ ​SYSTEMS​ ​APPROACH 
There are varying definitions of consciousness in philosophy of mind. To avoid                       
vagueness in discourse, it is best to mention the definition followed in this paper.                           
Consciousness refers to the capacity to sense and respond to the environment, owing                         
to the ability of a system to distinguish itself from the environment. This is the first sign                                 
of a sense of self- that the system can identify its spatiotemporal integrity (through                           
boundary ​ ​conditions).  
There are two senses in which we can approach consciousness: the how and the                           
why. The CSA answers the ​how and the notion of emergence answers the ​why within                             
the ​ ​framework ​ ​of ​ ​embodied ​ ​mind.  
Coming to the ​how: ​In the brain, the neurons consistently interact with one another                           
leading to the emergence of dynamic brain signatures. These dynamic brain                     
signatures are our mental states which are embedded throughout the body. As the                         
body receives the world, it is represented in the brain continually. A subject becomes                           
conscious of ​x when the rate of formation of cell assemblies passes a certain                           
threshold during the representation of ​x​. This ​x can be an external object or an object                               
within the representational model of the subject. By understanding the interaction                     
between neurons forming networks, it is possible to understand how different                     
cognitive functions are carried out, thus covering the easy problems of                     
consciousness.  
As the complexity of a system increases, its degree of consciousness also increases.                         
Thus, according to the complex systems approach, from the member of sentient order                         
with the lowest level of complexity, we witness consciousness                 
(mentality/intentionality). It is after the passing of a threshold of complexity that a                         
different kind of consciousness- self consciousness- arises in human beings, amongst                     
other ​ ​kind ​ ​of ​ ​beings.  
My interest in this paper is to focus heavily on the ​why dimension, so I take leave of                                   




7​ ​Physical ​ ​refers ​ ​to ​ ​that ​ ​which ​ ​is ​ ​exists ​ ​in​ ​the ​ ​spatiotemporal​ ​realm.  
8​ ​​(Mainzer ​ ​2008, ​ ​2004) 
9​ ​​(Krieger ​ ​2013) 
10(Kirilyuk ​ ​30 ​ ​Sep, ​ ​2003) 
 PART ​ ​4: ​ ​QUALIA: ​ ​AN ​ ​INTEGRATIVE ​ ​ENCOUNTER ​ ​OF​ ​THE​ ​EXISTENT ​ ​IN​ ​THE​ ​WORLD  
Qualia is the qualitative character of experience- it encompasses everything that the                       
body undergoes at the moment of experience (more aptly, moment-to-moment).                   
According to complex systems approach, every subject has representation of the                     
world. There are research studies on how the body is represented in various regions                           
of the brain. In the same way, the environment is also represented continually,                         
moment-to-moment, in the network of dynamic brain signatures. However, these                   
representations in themselves are placed within the world-orientation of the subject.                     
World-orientation is the way in which an individual looks at the world, to make sense                             
and navigate it for its survival. Thus, it is the subject’s model of reality. However, this                               
model of reality is not ​located (as a physical object would be) in the brain or in specific                                   
region of the body. The model of reality that every subject possesses is evident                           
through intersubjectivity, by witnessing the interaction that the subject with its world.                       
Consider a model of action that a football team creates: where is this model of action?                               
Though they could make a written blueprint of it, that is not ​what the model is. The                                 
model is observed in the game, in how the players are interacting with one another. In                               
the same way, we can witness the world-orientation/perspective of a subject through                       
the interaction she undertakes with the world. How is this world-orientation built? This                         
model is built as the subject develops within the environment and becomes familiar                         
with ​ ​it.  
The following three stages mention the process of how we receive and respond to                           
the world. They are intertwined. The linearity explicated here is only for the sake of                             
convenience. Though each step occurs, it is already involved with the series of steps                           
that have already taken place and are going to take place- like listening to a piece of                                 
music, the meaning of any sound in a song emerges through its relation to the sounds                               
that ​ ​have ​ ​previously ​ ​inhabited​ ​the​ ​song ​ ​and​ ​those​ ​which​ ​succeed ​ ​it.  
 
Stage 1: We are continually in interaction with our environment, since the moment of                           
our entrance into the world . Our sense organs receive input of multitude of sensory                           11
information. This receiving is not accessible to cognition at the first stage. In this                           
sense, it is unevaluated, bare receiving of information. This is akin to the concept of                             
indeterminate perception/nirvikalpa pratyaksa in Indian philosophy. This is also often                   
posited ​ ​as ​ ​the​ ​impenetrability​ ​of ​ ​cognition ​ ​in​ ​philosophy ​ ​of​ ​mind.  
 
Stage 2: The received information is re-presentation from moment-to-moment (in form                     
of dynamic brain signatures) within our world-orientation. As mentioned earlier, the                     
world-orientation is perspective of the existent towards its world, observable in the                       
intersubjectivity. Thus, any received information is never an alien object to us. It is                           
swallowed within the framework we set up to make sense of the world. At this                             
moment, the perception has become determinate- savikalpa pratyaksa. In terms of                     
philosophy ​ ​of ​ ​mind,​ ​it ​ ​is​ ​penetrated​ ​by​ ​the ​ ​cognition.  
 
Stage 3: The existent responds to any stimulus as an embodied mind, more aptly, the                             
mindful body. The body and mind cannot be separated ontologically- that is, they are                           
embedded onto each other. The mind grows on your body, as a grass which covers                             
11​ ​When ​ ​this ​ ​entrance ​ ​begins ​ ​is​ ​a ​ ​matter ​ ​of​ ​contention.​ ​Is ​ ​it ​ ​when ​ ​the​ ​embryo​ ​is ​ ​formed/at​ ​a ​ ​particular​ ​gestation 
stage ​ ​or ​ ​when ​ ​the ​ ​child ​ ​enters ​ ​the ​ ​environment ​ ​external​ ​to ​ ​mother’s ​ ​body?​ ​According​ ​to ​ ​many ​ ​research ​ ​studies,​ ​the 
embryo ​ ​is ​ ​also ​ ​in ​ ​constant ​ ​interaction ​ ​with ​ ​its ​ ​environment- ​ ​primarily, ​ ​the ​ ​mother’s ​ ​body ​ ​and ​ ​secondarily,​ ​the​ ​world 
that ​ ​surrounds ​ ​the ​ ​mother.  
 the fertile soil of a ranch. The body is thus full of mind. That which we receive is never                                     
alien- it is always received as a guest to a house is, we have already setup an                                 
environment within which it can be accommodated: this is the concept of                       
intentionality within philosophy of mind. The brain is continuously representing the                     12
body and its situatedness in the world within its world-orientation in form of dynamic                           
brain signatures. These signatures are embedded throughout the body through                   
regulatory powers of the brain. The mind is this process of an organism embodying an                             
intentional stance towards an other . This other can be it’s own self or an other in the                                 13
environment.  
 
This ​ ​process ​ ​can ​ ​be ​ ​stated ​ ​in​ ​the​ ​following ​ ​three​ ​ways: 
1. The body and mind share relationship of embodiment. The mind is a process                         
embedded ​ ​throughout ​ ​the ​ ​body.​ ​They​ ​are​ ​not​ ​ontologically ​ ​separate. 
2. The mindful body continually receives the world as a multitude of sensory                       
information which is represented in the brain in form of dynamic brain                       
signature. This representation is positioning of the stimulus within the subject’s                     
world-orientation. Thus, the mindful body is medium of receiving the world for                       
the brain. The brain is component of this body which has regulatory task of                           
representing ​ ​the​ ​stimulus​ ​within ​ ​the​ ​subject’s​ ​world-orientation .  14
3. Response of the existent to the stimulus is manifested through the mindful                       
body. The entire body manifests my intentional stance towards the other.                     
Intentionality refers to the capacity of an existent to direct its behaviour                       
towards​ ​an ​ ​other.  
Qualia, the qualitative character of an experience, is the integrative encounter of the                         
above three stages. This belongs to the mindful body as a whole and cannot be                             
reduced to the workings within any of the components of the body (like the brain or                               
others).  
 
PART ​ ​5: ​ ​PIECING​ ​IT ​ ​TOGETHER 
The hard problem of consciousness- how can we understand the subjective aspect of                         
an experience in an existent?- is misplaced, when it attempts to look for explanations                           
in the brain. Because qualia, the subjective aspect is an emergent/systemic property                       
of the mindful body, as a whole. It is an integrative encounter of the everything that                               
one undergoes at the moment of experience and thus, cannot be studied through                         
account ​ ​of ​ ​one ​ ​of ​ ​the ​ ​components​ ​of​ ​the​ ​body,​ ​the​ ​brain​ ​alone.  
It is, in principle, not possible to embody the qualia of a subject ​x in another subject ​y                                   
because the meaning of an experience is situated within the world-orientation of the                         15
subject ​x ​, which consists in the intersubjectivity that her mindful body has undergone                         
12​ ​“Every ​ ​mental ​ ​phenomenon ​ ​is​ ​characterized ​ ​by ​ ​what​ ​the​ ​Scholastics ​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Middle ​ ​Ages ​ ​called ​ ​the​ ​intentional ​ ​(or 
mental) ​ ​inexistence ​ ​of​ ​an ​ ​object,​ ​and ​ ​what ​ ​we ​ ​might​ ​call,​ ​though​ ​not​ ​wholly ​ ​unambiguously,​ ​reference​ ​to ​ ​a ​ ​content, 
direction ​ ​toward ​ ​an ​ ​object ​ ​(which ​ ​is​ ​not ​ ​to ​ ​be ​ ​understood ​ ​here ​ ​as ​ ​meaning ​ ​a ​ ​thing),​ ​or ​ ​immanent​ ​objectivity.​ ​Every 
mental ​ ​phenomenon ​ ​includes ​ ​something ​ ​as​ ​object​ ​within ​ ​itself…” ​ ​​(Brentano​ ​1973) 
13​ ​“Mental” ​ ​is ​ ​a ​ ​label ​ ​we ​ ​use ​ ​for ​ ​characterising ​ ​intentional ​ ​stance.​ ​Like​ ​we ​ ​use ​ ​the​ ​term ​ ​“bodily” ​ ​(state)​ ​to ​ ​talk ​ ​about 
that ​ ​which ​ ​characterises ​ ​the ​ ​stance ​ ​of ​ ​our ​ ​bodies ​ ​in ​ ​the​ ​world.  
14​ ​It ​ ​is ​ ​important ​ ​not ​ ​to ​ ​posit ​ ​this ​ ​regulatory ​ ​role ​ ​as ​ ​“governing”​ ​or ​ ​“mother”​ ​role.​ ​The ​ ​brain​ ​is​ ​a​ ​component​ ​of​ ​the 
mindful ​ ​body ​ ​and ​ ​has ​ ​the ​ ​task ​ ​of​ ​representation,​ ​within ​ ​the​ ​complex ​ ​systems ​ ​approach.​ ​It ​ ​does​ ​not​ ​have​ ​the​ ​role​ ​of ​ ​a 
controlling ​ ​unit ​ ​or ​ ​a ​ ​mother ​ ​component ​ ​within ​ ​the ​ ​system.​ ​Yes, ​ ​the​ ​functions ​ ​it​ ​carries ​ ​out​ ​along ​ ​with ​ ​other 
components ​ ​of ​ ​the ​ ​body ​ ​are ​ ​more ​ ​important ​ ​than ​ ​the​ ​role​ ​of​ ​many ​ ​other ​ ​organs ​ ​but​ ​the​ ​role​ ​does​ ​not​ ​eclipse​ ​the 
independent ​ ​autonomy ​ ​of ​ ​the ​ ​mindful ​ ​body ​ ​as ​ ​a ​ ​whole.​ ​The ​ ​system ​ ​as ​ ​a ​ ​whole ​ ​has ​ ​a ​ ​global​ ​structure​ ​which ​ ​is ​ ​​other 
(not ​ ​​greater ​) ​ ​than ​ ​the ​ ​sum ​ ​of ​ ​functions ​ ​of​ ​all ​ ​its ​ ​components.  
15​ ​Meaning ​ ​being ​ ​the ​ ​value ​ ​of ​ ​a ​ ​certain ​ ​experience​ ​of ​ ​a ​ ​subject,​ ​within ​ ​its ​ ​world-orientation  
 in the past and the manner in which her mindful body manifests the future                           
expectations in her responses to the world. Thus, to pick out a certain neural map                             
which is considered the representational map of a certain event and place it in                           
another person’s brain would be to eliminate the value of that event. Because the                           
value of an event for an existent is derived, not from that which a particular                             
component undergoes, but in the experience of the event situated between the past                         
and future of the existent and most importantly, in the world-orientation which is a                           
systemic property of the whole ontologically extended in the intersubjectivity of an                       
existent.  
We can access qualia of the other, where access implies the ability to approach, is                             
through sources of information that discuss the mindful body as a whole. These                         
sources of information include those writings which talk about the experience of a                         
mindful body as a whole- writings of existentialism, phenomenology, literature                   
amongst others. Thus, science, defined as systematically decomposing the subject to                     
its components to explain the properties of system, cannot give us access to the                           
scientist. However, science understood as the inclination of choosing a method in                       
sync with the nature of object of concern, can create a space where every existent                             
can be understood as a complex system with independent autonomy and also as a                           
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